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An Exercise in Adversarial Collaboration 
By Barbara Mellers,1 Ralph Hertwig,2 and Daniel Kahneman2 
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 
General Article 
'Ohio State University; 2Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany; and3 Princeton University 
The present article offers an approach to scientific debate called ad- 
versarial collaboration. The approach requires both parties to agree 
on empirical tests for resolving a dispute and to conduct these tests 
with the help of an arbiter. In dispute were Hertwig 's claims that fre- 
quency formats eliminate conjunction effects and that the conjunction 
effects previously reported by Kahneman and Tversky occurred be- 
cause some participants interpreted the word "and" in "bank tellers 
and feminists " as a union operator. Hertwig proposed two new con- 
junction phrases, "and are" and "who are," that would eliminate the 
ambiguity. Kahneman disagreed with Hertwig 's predictions for "and 
are" but agreed with his predictions for "who are." Mellers served as 
arbiter. Frequency formats by themselves did not eliminate conjunction 
effects with any of the phrases, but when filler items were removed, 
conjunction effects disappeared with Hertwig 's phrases. Kahneman 
and Hertwig offer different interpretations of the findings. We discuss 
the benefits of adversarial collaboration over replies and rejoinders, 
and present a suggested protocol for adversarial collaboration. 
This article presents a new method for resolving scientific 
debate, which we call adversarial collaboration. The authors did 
not agree when they began the collaboration, nor do they agree 
now. But theoretical agreement is not necessary for a successful 
adversarial collaboration. Success should be gauged by the ex- 
tent to which joint efforts yield surprising results, insightful 
discussions, and testable hypotheses about outstanding issues. 
In Table 1, we provide suggestions for conducting an adversar- 
ial collaboration based on a protocol originally developed by 
Kahneman, but adapted in light of our experiences. For another 
project in a similar spirit, see Gilovich, Medvec, and Kahne- 
man (1998). 
Our starting point is a controversy about biases in probabi- 
listic reasoning in general and conjunction effects in particular 
(Gigerenzer, 1996; Kahneman & Tversky, 1996). We focus on 
a story known as the Linda problem (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1982, 1983). Participants were told: 
Linda is 3 1 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored 
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. 
Participants then ranked statements about Linda according 
to their probability. These statements included "Linda is a bank 
teller," and "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist 
movement." The majority of respondents judged "Linda is a bank 
teller and is active in the feminist movement" as more probable 
than "Linda is a bank teller" in both within-subjects designs (in 
which participants judged both statements) and between-subjects 
designs (in which different groups judged the two statements). 
Tversky and Kahneman (1983) pointed out that these re- 
sponses violate the conjunction rule, according to which the 
probability of the intersection of two events cannot exceed the 
probability of either single event. Furthermore, they argued that 
participants based their judgments on the representativeness heu- 
ristic: Linda was judged as more likely to be a bank teller and ac- 
tive in the feminist movement than to be a bank teller because 
she resembles a prototypical feminist bank teller more than a 
prototypical bank teller. Both claims have sparked considerable 
controversy (e.g., Adler, 1984; Dulany & Hilton, 1991; Gigeren- 
zer, 1991, 1996; Politzer & Noveck, 1991). 
Our collaboration focuses on conjunction effects with fre- 
quency formats. Using a within-subjects design, Tversky and 
Kahneman (1983, p. 309) found that conjunction effects were 
markedly reduced when information was presented in the form 
of frequencies. They used a question about health history and 
age; later research demonstrated reduced conjunction effects with 
Linda (e.g., Fiedler, 1988). For example, Hertwig and Gigerenzer 
(1999) gave participants a story about 200 women who fit the de- 
scription of Linda. Participants were asked questions such as "How 
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Table 1. Suggestions for adversarial collaboration 
1 . When tempted to write a critique or to run an experimental refutation of a recent publication, consider the possibility of proposing joint 
research under an agreed protocol. We call the scholars engaged in such an effort participants. If theoretical differences are deep or if 
there are large differences in experimental routines between the laboratories, consider the possibility of asking a trusted colleague to 
coordinate the effort, referee disagreements, and collect the data. We call that person an arbiter. 
2. Agree on the details of an initial study, designed to subject the opposing claims to an informative empirical test. The participants should 
seek to identify results that would change their mind, at least to some extent, and should explicitly anticipate their interpretations of 
outcomes that would be inconsistent with their theoretical expectations. These predictions should be recorded by the arbiter to prevent 
future disagreements about remembered interpretations. 
3. If there are disagreements about unpublished data, a replication that is agreed to by both participants should be included in the initial 
study. 
4. Accept in advance that the initial study will be inconclusive. Allow each side to propose an additional experiment to exploit the fount of 
hindsight wisdom that commonly becomes available when disliked results are obtained. Additional studies should be planned jointly, 
with the arbiter resolving disagreements as they occur. 
5. Agree in advance to produce an article with all participants as authors. The arbiter can take responsibility for several parts of the article: 
an introduction to the debate, the report of experimental results, and a statement of agreed-upon conclusions. If significant disagree- 
ments remain, the participants should write individual discussions. The length of these discussions should be determined in advance 
and monitored by the arbiter. An author who has more to say than the arbiter allows should indicate this fact in a footnote and provide 
readers with a way to obtain the added material. 
6. The data should be under the control of the arbiter, who should be free to publish with only one of the original participants if the other 
refuses to cooperate. Naturally, the circumstances of such an event should be part of the report. 
7. All experimentation and writing should be done quickly, within deadlines agreed to in advance. Delay is likely to breed discord. 
8. The arbiter should have the casting vote in selecting a venue for publication, and editors should be informed that requests for major 
revisions are likely to create impossible problems for the participants in the exercise. 
many of the 200 women are bank tellers and are active in the femi- 
nist movement?" Hertwig and Gigerenzer found that in within-sub- 
jects designs with frequencies, conjunction effects disappeared. 
Gigerenzer (1991) proposed a general thesis that frequency 
representations can reduce, and even eliminate, judgmental er- 
rors and biases. He and his collaborators developed models that 
specify when and why frequency and probability judgments are 
valid or invalid, according to different norms (e.g., Gigerenzer & 
Hoffrage, 1995; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991). In 
a reply to Gigerenzer, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) argued 
that (a) frequency representations do not eliminate reliance on 
judgmental heuristics in general, nor representativeness in par- 
ticular; (b) within-subjects designs may provide cues about the 
correct rule that enable people to overcome biases - and fre- 
quency formats make some cues especially transparent; and (c) 
between-subjects designs are most appropriate for studying the 
biases associated with heuristics. 
To demonstrate their claims, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) 
conducted both a within-subjects test and a between-subjects 
test of conjunction effects. They gave three groups of students 
the Linda problem in a frequency format. The first group esti- 
mated the number of women who were "bank tellers," "bank 
tellers and active feminists," and "high school teachers." The 
second group estimated the number of women who were "bank 
tellers" and "high school teachers," and the third group esti- 
mated the number of women who were "bank tellers and active 
feminists" and "high school teachers." 
The first group provided a within-subjects test of conjunc- 
tion effects, and the second and third groups provided a be- 
tween-subjects test. In the within-subjects test, the majority of 
responses were consistent with the conjunction rule. But in the 
between-subjects test, responses violated the conjunction rule; 
the average estimate of "bank tellers and active feminists" was 
significantly larger than the average estimate of "bank tellers." 
Kahneman and Tversky argued that participants rely on the 
representativeness heuristic in between-subjects designs even 
when information is provided in frequency formats. In within- 
subjects designs, participants are more likely to detect set in- 
clusion and override the heuristic. 
Hertwig (1997) challenged Kahneman and Tversky 's (1996) 
conclusion by noting that natural language terms such as "and" 
can be semantically ambiguous. This is crucial because in a fair 
test, the phrase "and" must have the same meaning in probabil- 
ity theory as in natural language. In probability theory, "and" 
refers to an intersection, but in natural language, "and" can be 
either a union or an intersection of events. For example, the sen- 
tence "We invited friends and colleagues to the party" implies a 
union, not an intersection, of friends and colleagues. See Ein- 
horn and Hogarth (1986) and Birnbaum, Anderson, and Hynan 
(1990) for further discussion of the semantic ambiguity of the 
"and" operator. 
Hertwig (1997) also pointed out that Kahneman and Tver- 
sky used different phrases when investigating probabilities and 
frequencies. With probabilities, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
had used the phrase "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the 
feminist movement," a noun-verb combination. But with fre- 
quencies, Kahneman and Tversky (1996) gave participants the 
phrase "bank tellers and active feminists," a noun-noun combi- 
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nation. Hertwig argued that the semantic ambiguity of "and" is 
particularly pronounced with noun-noun combinations. If some 
of the participants had interpreted "and" as a union rather than an 
intersection, Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) between-subjects 
test of the conjunction rule would be invalid. 
Hertwig (1997) suggested that the phrase "bank tellers who 
are active in the feminist movement" would make the union in- 
terpretation unlikely. He further noted that Tversky and Kahne- 
man (1983) had used a similar phrase with probabilities. Hertwig 
then conducted two between-subjects tests of conjunction effects. 
He gave three groups of students from the University of Munich 
the Linda problem used by Kahneman and Tversky (1996). The 
first group estimated the number of women fitting the description 
of Linda who were "high school teachers" and "bank tellers." The 
second group estimated the number of women who were "high 
school teachers" and "bank tellers and active feminists." The 
third group estimated the number of women who were "high 
school teachers" and "bank tellers who are active in the feminist 
movement." The first and second groups provided a between- 
subjects test of the word "and," and the first and third groups 
provided a between-subjects test of "who are." 
Hertwig (1997) replicated Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) 
between-subjects results with "and"; the average estimated num- 
ber of women who were "bank tellers and active feminists" was 
significantly larger than the average number of women who were 
"bank tellers." Hertwig also found that the average number of 
women who were "bank tellers who are active in the feminist 
movement" did not differ from the average number of women 
who were "bank tellers." 
Based on these results, he argued that the conjunction ef- 
fects of Kahneman and Tversky (1996) may have occurred be- 
cause at least some of the participants had interpreted "and" as 
a union. With the less ambiguous phrase "who are," the union 
interpretation was less likely and conjunction effects vanished.1 
Hertwig also observed that 30% of participants who judged 
"bank tellers and active feminists" spontaneously asked whether 
the phrase referred to the intersection or the union of events. The 
experimenter told them to use the interpretation that seemed 
most appropriate. Hertwig concluded that apparent violations 
of the conjunction rule with frequency formats in a between- 
subjects design could appear or disappear, depending on the in- 
terpretation of the conjunction phrase. 
At this point, our collaboration began. Kahneman conceded 
that "and" can be semantically ambiguous, but he did not be- 
lieve that participants in Kahneman and Tversky's (1996) study 
had interpreted "and" as a union. He argued that participants 
represented the conjunction as a prototype, as implied by the rep- 
resentativeness heuristic. Kahneman also thought that the phrase 
"bank tellers who are active in the feminist movement" is restric- 
tive and strongly cued participants to interpret the conjunction as 
an intersection. 
Hertwig proposed an alternative conjunction phrase, "bank 
tellers and are active in the feminist movement," that he thought 
would also make the union interpretation unlikely. Hertwig noted 
that this phrase mapped Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) original 
phrase, "Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist move- 
ment," into a frequency format. 
Kahneman accepted "and are," but predicted that it would 
yield conjunction effects. He also proposed the phrase "femi- 
nist bank tellers," which removed the conjunction phrase en- 
tirely, and predicted that it would also yield conjunction effects. 
We jointly designed three experiments to test these hypotheses, 
and Mellers collected the data. We now present methods and a 
brief summary of the results. Interpretations of the results are 
presented in the Discussion. 
METHOD 
Two personality sketches, one of Linda and the other of 
James, were used in the three experiments. The Linda story read: 
Linda is 3 1 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored 
in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of 
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear 
demonstrations. Of 100 people like Linda, how many are . . . ? 
The James story read: 
James grew up in a Bohemian family. His father was a musician, and 
his mother was a painter. They lived together for 40 years and never 
got married. James was a very talented child with a special gift for 
comedy, but he turned into a rebellious troublemaker inhis youth. He 
dropped out of college after two years and traveled to Asia to learn 
crafts. James is now 35 years old. Of 100 people like James, how 
many are . . . ? 
Instructions said: 
We are interested in the judgments and inferences that people make 
about other peoples' professions, politics, and hobbies. In each of the 
following problems, we will tell you about a person. We will then ask, 
of 100 people like the target person, how many would fit a particular 
description of a job, political persuasion, or hobby? Please state your 
best guess when answering the following questions. 
In each story, there was one likely target item and one unlikely 
target item. All three experiments used the target items "bank tell- 
ers" and "feminists" in the Linda story and "artists" and "Repub- 
lications" in the James story. The conjunction phrases "and" and 
"and are" appeared in all three experiments. A few other conjunc- 
tion phrases were included in Experiments 1 and 2, as shown in 
Table 2. Filler items were manipulated across experiments. 
1. Hertwig found that students estimated an average of 132 women out of 
1,000 were "bank tellers," 337 were "bank tellers and active feminists," and 
125 were "bank tellers who are active in the feminist movement." Correspond- 
ing medians were 95, 250, and 23. Standard deviations were 149, 293, and 171, 
respectively, and the size of the sample in each group was 30. 
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Table 2. Average frequency estimates for all experiments 
Linda story James story 
T,. , r _ . Experiment ^ . .. Experiment Kind of target or Target item or      _     Target item or      _      
form of conjunction conjunction phrase 1 2 3 conjunction phrase 1 2 3 
Likely target Feminists 58.1(2.4) 47.7(3.4) 47.9(4.5) Artists 41.0(2.7) 45.1(2.6) 47.1(3.3) 
Unlikely target Bank tellers 24.6(1.9) 21.4(2.0) 14.3(2.9) Republicans 28.9(2.1) 19.8(1.8) 12.7(2.6) 
"and" "and" 39.9(2.0) 30.4(2.3) 26.4(3.9) "and" 33.1(1.8) 42.7(2.4) 22.9(3.4) 
"and are" "and are" 40.2(2.7) 21.8(2.1) 22.8(2.7) "and are" 32.0(2.5) 20.0(1.9) 21.4(2.7) 
[Unlikely target] Bank tellers 
"who are" who are Republicans 
[likely target] feminists 34.6(2.3) 23.1(2.2) - who are artists 26.5(2.2) 24.0(2.6) - 
[Likely target] Feminists Artists 
"who are" who are who are 
[unlikely target] bank tellers 27.6(2.2) - - Republicans 29.5(2.5) - - 
Targets combined Feminist 
with no conjunction bank tellers      32.3 (2.3) -      - Republican artists 26.0(2.2) -      - 
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Boldface indicates significant results, p < .05. 
In Experiment 1, each participant judged the frequency of one 
target item and one filler item for each problem. Target items var- 
ied across groups. Filler items were "high school teachers" for 
Linda and "unemployed" for James. Undergraduates at Ohio State 
University completed the task as part of a larger take-home ques- 
tionnaire, and received credit toward a course requirement for 
their participation. An average of 108 participants served in each 
group. 
In Experiment 2, each participant judged the frequency of one 
target item for each problem; no filler items were included. Tar- 
get items varied across groups. A third problem was added in 
that experiment (adapted from the Bill problem in Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1983). Ohio State University undergraduates were paid 
$1 for completing the task with three problems. An average of 96 
participants served in each group. 
In Experiment 3, each participant judged the frequency of 
one target item and five filler items (shown in Table 3) for each 
problem. Target items varied across groups. Instructions read: 
We would like you to answer these questions in two stages. First, rank 
the categories from most to least frequent. Write a "1" next to the most 
frequent category, a "2" next to the second most frequent one, etc. 
When you have done the ranking, please estimate how many of the 
100 people belong to each category. 
Undergraduates at the University of California at Berkeley vol- 
unteered to complete the questionnaire in class. An average of 
40 participants served in each group. 
RESULTS 
Table 2 presents selected results from the three experiments. 
Average frequency estimates for conjunction phrases and target 
items are shown for Linda and James, with standard errors in 
parentheses. Of interest was whether the average frequency es- 
timate for each conjunction was significantly greater than the 
average frequency estimate for the unlikely target item. Tests 
were done with an alpha level of 5%, and significant effects are 
shown in bold. 
Results from the Linda problem in Experiment 1 show that 
conjunction effects occurred with all of the conjunctive phrases 
except one, "feminists who are bank tellers." The results repli- 
cated and extended those of Kahneman and Tversky (1996). 
Conjunction effects occurred not only with "and," but also with 
"and are" and "who are." Furthermore, results for "and" and 
"and are" were no different from each other. Finally, conjunc- 
tion effects occurred with "feminist bank tellers." 
In stark contrast, the James story revealed no conjunction 
effects whatsoever. Even the phrase "Republicans and artists" 
did not produce a conjunction effect. In hindsight, we believed 
there was less opportunity for conjunction effects to emerge in 
this problem because the difference between the estimates of 
Table 3. Filler items and average ranks in Experiment 3 
Filler item Rank 
Linda story 
Members of the League of Women Voters 2.5 
Psychiatric social workers 2.8 
Teachers in elementary school 3.4 
Work in a bookstore and take Yoga 4.2 
Insurance people 4.9 
James story 
Use recreational drugs frequently 2.6 
Often meditate 3.0 
Write fiction and drive cabs 3.4 
Work in sales and are vegetarians 4. 1 
Work in banking 5. 1 
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the target items (artists vs. Republicans) was only 12.1. With 
Linda, the difference between the estimates of the target items 
(feminists vs. bank tellers) was 33.5. 
We further suspected that the selection of filler items had 
contributed to the differences between Linda and James. With 
Linda, the average frequency estimate for the filler item, "high 
school teachers," was smaller than that of the more likely target 
item, "feminists" (34.8 vs. 58.1). However, with James, the av- 
erage frequency estimate of the filler item, "unemployed," was 
larger than that of the more likely target item, "artists" (55.3 vs. 
41.0). When the average estimate of the filler item was larger 
than that of the more likely target item, the difference between 
estimates of target items appeared to shrink. To avoid this prob- 
lem, Hertwig proposed that Experiment 2 examine conjunction 
effects with no filler items. 
Results for Experiment 2 show that conjunction effects oc- 
curred with "and," but vanished with "and are" and "who are." 
The average frequency estimate for "and" was significantly larger 
than that for "and are." Precisely the same pattern of results was 
observed for the Bill problem (adapted from Tversky & Kahne- 
man, 1983). Hertwig's predictions for Experiment 1 were now 
confirmed in Experiment 2. 
Kahneman suspected that participants adopted an analytic 
approach when judging a conjunction item in isolation. When a 
filler item was present, the implicit requirement to compare the 
conjunction item with it favored the wholistic approach that the 
representativeness heuristic requires. He proposed that Experi- 
ment 3 examine conjunction effects with multiple filler items 
and a ranking instruction prior to the estimation instruction, af- 
ter Tversky and Kahneman (1982). 
Results for Experiment 3 show that, with multiple filler items, 
conjunction effects occurred with "and" and "and are" for both 
Linda and James. Furthermore, the results for "and" and for "and 
are" did not differ. 
DISCUSSION 
We could easily imagine more experiments, but we had 
agreed that each party would be allowed one study after Exper- 
iment 1. We did not think the experiments would resolve all the 
issues, nor did this miracle occur. Nevertheless, we discovered 
more - and made the discoveries more enjoyably - than if we 
had engaged in replies and rejoinders. Because Hertwig and 
Kahneman predicted different outcomes for "and are," we fo- 
cus our discussion on that phrase. Our most striking finding - 
which none of us had anticipated - was that "and" and "and are" 
produced similar results in Experiment 1 (for the Linda problem) 
and Experiment 3, but different results in Experiment 2. 
Hertwig and Kahneman agree on some points. They agree 
that when filler items are present, responses to target items are 
implicitly comparative and more likely to produce conjunction 
effects. Hertwig and Chase (1998) offered a similar interpreta- 
tion of target items in the presence of filler items. The interpre- 
tation is also supported by the finding that, both in the Munich 
data and in our own results, conjunction effects were more 
likely to occur when participants gave responses that summed 
to 100% - clear evidence of a comparison.2 In our experiments 
and the Munich experiment, participants were never told, either 
implicitly or explicitly, that their frequency estimates for the 
conjunction and filler items should sum to 100%. Some adopted 
this convention, but others did not. In Experiment 1, approxi- 
mately two thirds of participants gave responses that summed 
to 100%, whereas in the Munich experiment, only one third 
gave responses that summed to 100%. Hertwig and Kahneman 
also agree that different psychological processes occur with com- 
parative responses and noncomparative responses. However, 
they disagree about the nature of those processes. Hertwig and 
Kahneman now present their own perspectives. 
Hertwig's View 
Between-subjects designs are strange animals. They can lead 
to paradoxical, even absurd, inferences (e.g., Birnbaum, 1982, 
1999). I agree with Varey, Mellers, and Birnbaum (1990), who 
argued that "one should be extremely cautious when drawing in- 
ferences from between-subjects comparisons of judgments" (p. 
623). This advice is especially pertinent when one aims to inves- 
tigate adherence to a rule of internal consistency, such as the 
conjunction rule. In our experiments, the filler items strongly af- 
fected the results obtained. One should keep in mind that filler 
items are superfluous in between-subjects designs in which 
each person sees one of the two single events or their conjunc- 
tion, but never both. But when filler items are present, how do 
they interfere with people's judgments for the target items? 
One possibility is that they induce comparisons that reflect the 
relative support for one category (e.g., high school teachers) 
over the other (e.g., bank tellers). If this were the case, then a 
first step toward a better understanding of the dynamics of 
comparative processes would be to explore how the presence 
of specific filler items affects the estimates for the target items. 
Take Experiment 3 as an example. Here, the presence of 
filler items appears to have differentially interfered with the es- 
timates for the target items. Relative to Experiment 2, in which 
no filler items were present, the filler items in Experiment 3 
dramatically reduced the frequency estimates for "bank tell- 
ers." At the same time, however, the estimates for the conjunc- 
tion "bank tellers and are feminists" and for the second single 
event, "feminists," remained essentially unchanged (see Table 
2; the same pattern is evident in the James problem). Of course, 
smaller estimates for "bank tellers" combined with essentially 
2. Hertwig (1997) found that when responses to the target item and the filler 
item summed to 100%, conjunction effects occurred with "and" and "who are." 
When responses did not sum to 100%, both effects vanished. Results from Ex- 
periment 1 were somewhat similar. When responses to the target and filler items 
summed to 100%, conjunction effects occurred with "and," "who are," and "and 
are." But when responses did not sum to 100%, conjunction effects vanished 
with "and" and "who are." However, they continued to occur with "and are." 
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unchanged estimates for "bank tellers and are feminists" increase 
the likelihood of finding conjunction effects. In other words, by 
choosing specific filler items, it appears to be possible to make 
conjunction effects appear or disappear. This conclusion is also 
in line with the findings suggesting that specific filler items can 
reduce or increase the differences between the estimates for the 
two single-event target items (see Experiment 1). 
Implicit comparative processes may also explain why the 
phrase "who are" yielded a conjunction effect in Experiment 1 
(with the Linda problem) but not in the Munich experiment. In 
the Munich experiment, only a minority of estimates for the 
conjunction item and filler item summed to 100%, but in Ex- 
periment 1, a majority did. This is a crucial difference. Both the 
Munich data and the data in Experiment 1 show that conjunc- 
tion effects were more likely to occur when judgments summed 
to 100%. 
Returning to the issue on which we initially disagreed - the 
semantic ambiguity of natural language terms such as "and" - 
the ambiguity of "and" does a good job of explaining the find- 
ings in Experiment 2, in which no filler items were present and 
only the semantically ambiguous "and" produced conjunction 
effects. Nevertheless, I agree with Kahneman that semantic 
ambiguity appears to have played less of a role in Experiments 
1 and 3. But I also believe that it is too early to conclude that 
semantic ambiguity plays no role in the context of implicit 
comparisons. It may do so in a subtler way. For instance, in the 
Munich experiment, "and" more often led to judgments that 
summed to 100% than did "who are." 
Where do we go from here? Next to semantic ambiguity of 
the "and" operator - an issue that, in my view, is neglected in 
judgment and decision-making research, which often employs 
text problems - the most interesting finding in our experiments 
is the impact of comparative processes. To shed light on their 
dynamics, future experiments may attempt to clarify how the 
content of filler item and target item interacts so that conjunc- 
tion effects appear or vanish. Another interesting question is to 
what extent the finding that conjunction effects disappear when 
the conjunction is judged in isolation generalizes to representa- 
tions other than frequencies. In other words, will the conjunc- 
tion effect also disappear under this condition in a probability 
representation? 
Kahneman's View 
It is useful to make two familiar distinctions when discuss- 
ing prediction by representativeness: 
• Extensional versus intensional formats for the mental represen- 
tation of categories: An extensional representation identifies a 
category by its membership; an intensional representation iden- 
tifies a category by the properties of its prototypical member. • Intuitive versus deliberate modes of thinking: Intuitive thinking 
is perception-like, rapid, effortless, and generally intensional. 
Deliberate thinking is reasoning-like, critical, and analytic; it is 
also slow, effortful, controlled, and rule-governed (Chaiken & 
Trope, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2000). The processing of ex- 
tensional representations appears to require deliberate thinking. 
In these terms, the hypothesis of prediction by representa- 
tiveness involves two separate assumptions. The first - amply 
supported by research in social cognition - is that prototypes 
are routinely evoked by mentions of social categories. The sec- 
ond is that judgments of probability or frequency in Linda-like 
problems are based on assessments of similarity between a per- 
sonality description and a category prototype. The most direct 
evidence for the representativeness hypothesis is the fact that 
the rankings of outcomes by probability and by representative- 
ness have repeatedly been shown to be identical (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). A glance at the 
judgments of filler items in Table 3 should convince the reader 
that frequency judgments follow a similar rule. 
Tversky and I believed that prototype representations nor- 
mally govern judgments. The baseline case is therefore that 
conjunction errors will occur, even in the frequency format, un- 
less blocked by powerful extensional cues, such as the within- 
subjects design provides (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1983). In contrast, Hertwig proposed that the 
baseline case is that conjunction errors will not occur in the fre- 
quency format. Implicitly assuming an extensional representa- 
tion, he proposed that conjunction errors arise when "and" is 
interpreted as a union operator, and that the results Tversky and 
I reported (Kahneman & Tversky, 1996) were an artifact of se- 
mantic ambiguity. 
The semantic-ambiguity hypothesis was tested and conclu- 
sively rejected in Experiments 1 and 3, in which the effects of 
the unambiguous "and are" were undistinguishable from the 
effects of "and." However, the results of the instructive experi- 
ment that Hertwig proposed came as a complete surprise to me: 
Conjunction effects completely disappeared with "and are" in 
Experiment 2, whereas the effects for "and" were stable across 
all experiments. 
There is no reason to believe that the union interpretation of 
"and" played a role in Experiment 2, because it did not in the 
other experiments. The odd result that requires explanation is 
why the presence or absence of fillers affected judgments of 
"and are." I infer from this finding that (a) the implicit instruc- 
tion to compare the target item to the filler item favored a uni- 
fied prototype representation of the conjunction category in 
Experiments 1 and 3, for "and are" as well as for "and," and (b) 
the exclusive focusing of attention on a single item in Experi- 
ment 2 favored a deliberate analytic approach, in which respon- 
dents were able to detect the restrictive implication of "and are." 
This admittedly post hoc interpretation is readily testable. 
For example, it entails that conjunction errors with "and are" 
should be restored by replicating Experiment 2 under mild cog- 
nitive load, or after a positive-mood manipulation (Schwarz & 
Clore, 1996). Conversely, conjunction errors should be re- 
duced - perhaps even with "and" - by replicating Experiment 
1 (with filler items) under conditions that focus participants' at- 
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tention on the language of the items, by requiring respondents 
to read them aloud, or by using an earlier task to prime an ana- 
lytic approach. There are other ways of extending the empirical 
study of the issues we raised. For example, the initial issue on 
which we disagreed - whether respondents interpret "and" as a 
union operator - can be tested directly by asking them to indi- 
cate their chosen interpretation on a Venn diagram. And an is- 
sue on which our views are converging - the role of comparative 
strategies as moderators of conjunction effects - also invites fur- 
ther empirical exploration. 
CONCLUSION 
Our joint efforts demonstrate the benefits of adversarial col- 
laboration as a method for conducting scientific controversy. 
The major benefit is that both parties are likely to recognize 
limitations of their claims. In our case, Hertwig acknowledges 
that the semantic ambiguity of "and" is only one factor that 
contributes to conjunction effects in the frequency format. 
Kahneman acknowledges that the experiments have identified 
conditions under which the representativeness heuristic is over- 
ridden, and that there may be more to be discovered. 
Collaborating with an adversary is not easy. In Table 1, we 
offer suggestions that would have made our experience better. 
Despite our mishaps, we hope the approach catches on. In an 
ideal world, scholars would feel obliged to accept an offer of 
adversarial collaboration. Editors would require adversaries to 
collaborate prior to, or instead of, writing independent exchanges. 
Scientific meetings would allot time for scholars engaged in ad- 
versarial collaboration to present their joint findings. In short, ad- 
versarial collaboration would become the norm, not the exception. 
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